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ABSTRACT 
 
A quarter of all fatal General Aviation accidents in the UK during the period 
1980 to 2006 involved Loss of Control (LoC) in Visual Meteorological 
Conditions (VMC).   LoC has consistently appeared in accident statistics over 
this period, but at apparently different rates for different aircraft types.   This 
raises two important questions - why do these LoC events happen and why is 
there a difference between aircraft types?. 
 
One case in point is that of the Cessna 150 /152 and over the 27-year period 
analysed, the Cessna 150 falls approximately on the average for fatal 
accidents in the UK GA fleet, whereas the Cessna 152 exhibits a lower 
accident rate.   Brunel Flight Safety Laboratory, in conjunction with the UK 
General Aviation Safety Council, undertook to try and understand why this is 
so.   The key design differences in relation to performance and handling 
qualities were researched using available published material and informal 
interviews with type-experienced students, pilots and flying instructors. 
 
A flight test programme was conducted using examples of both aircraft types 
to gather additional research data, to assess and compare the apparent 
performance and handling qualities (both qualitatively and quantitatively).   
Flight tests were performed at three different CG conditions relevant to the 
key design differences, concentrating upon apparent longitudinal (static and 
dynamic) stability and control characteristics, stall and low-speed handling 
characteristics, and cockpit ergonomics / pilot workload.   In all tests, normal 
(unmodified) flying club aircraft were used, in most cases with a 2-man 
(TP+FTE) crew.   Data was recorded manually on test cards and 
automatically using a low-cost, commercially available, portable FDR. 
 
Proven theory was used to estimate static margins and pilot stick forces and 
gradients in the region of the stall, the pre-cursor to an LoC event. 
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The paper will cover the execution of these flight tests within a university 
environment (preparation, pre and post-test analysis, construction of Cooper-
Harper tasks) and the use of low-cost, automated flight data recording.   It will 
also discuss the team’s lessons learned, initial findings and the ongoing 
research into aircraft, pilot and environmental causal factors involving LoC 
incidents within the light aircraft community.   On completion, it is hoped that 
this research programme will contribute to improving operational safety and 
provide supporting ideas to make future light aircraft ‘LoC-proof’. 
 
 
NOTATION 
 
Symbol Meaning Units of 
Measure 
BFSL Brunel Flight Safety Laboratory  
CAA United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority  
CAS Calibrated Airspeed knots 
CG Centre of Gravity %MAC 
CVR Cockpit Voice Recorder  
CFIT Controlled Flight into Terrain  
CRM Crew Resource Management  
FDR Flight Data Recorder  
FTE Flight Test Engineer  
GASCo General Aviation Safety Council  
HFACS Human Factors Analysis & Classification System  
HQRs Cooper-Harper Handling Quality Ratings  
IAS Indicated Airspeed knots 
IMC Instrument Meteorological Conditions  
LoC Loss of Control  
LSS Longitudinal Static Stability  
MAC Mean Aerodynamic Chord inches 
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MIAS Indicated Airspeed in Miles per Hour mph 
MTOW Maximum Take-Off Weight pounds 
PIC Pilot in Command  
PiL Pilot in the Loop  
TP Test Pilot  
VMC Visual Meteorological Conditions  
VS0 Stall speed in the landing configuration mph, IAS or knots CAS 
 
VCAS Calibrated Airspeed knots 
VTAS True Airspeed knots 
VEAS Equivalent Airspeed knots 
VWIND Wind Speed knots 
VGND Ground Speed knots 
W&CG Weight and Balance  
ACφ  Aircraft Yaw Angle degrees 
WINDφ  Wind Drift Angle degrees 
σ  Air Density Ratio  
θ  Temperature Ratio  
h Altitude km 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Each year in the UK, USA, Australia & Canada, over 300 people lose their 
lives in General Aviation (GA) accidents.   Approximately one third of these 
involve Loss of Control (LoC), a situation that arises when the actual direction 
of the aircraft and the pilot’s intended direction differ. 
 
In association with the General Aviation Safety Council (GASCo), Brunel 
Flight Safety Laboratory has instigated a project to find out why these LoC 
events, many of which fall into the classic “stall-spin” pattern, happen and why 
certain aircraft types appear to be more susceptible than others.   Having a 
better appreciation of the causal factors will hopefully contribute to improving 
operational safety and also have an input into helping to make future GA 
aircraft ‘LoC-proof’. 
 
A recent survey carried out by GASCo [1] for the period 1980 to 2006 (Figure 
1), showed that for fixed wing aeroplanes (MTOW 994 - 12,569lb), LoC in 
VMC conditions was a factor in 25% of all fatal accidents with a further 8% 
involved LoC in IMC conditions.   Low flying, aerobatics and Controlled Flight 
Into Terrain (CFIT) the next two highest causal categories of 16% and 12% 
respectively, also involve LoC to some degree.   The net result is that LoC 
probably accounts for many more of these fatalities in any one year. 
 
 
Figure 1, Type of Accident UK (GASCo) 
This paper describes a programme of investigation into the reasons for stall 
related LoC incidents – this starts with a model combining aircraft and pilot 
characteristics that attempts to explain the causes of LoC, but then expands 
into description of the planning and results for a case study involving two 
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similar aircraft  - the Cessna C150 and C152, with markedly different safety 
records.  Proposed follow on work from this study is then described, along 
with lessons learned – in particular concerning design and management of the 
test programme associated with the case study. 
 
 
PILOT IN THE LOOP 
 
To better understand the underlying causes for these fatal accidents, it is 
necessary to examine the total environment in which both a pilot and aircraft 
operate.   The pilot has specific tasks to perform (which we will term 
“aviating”) and is part of a complex closed-loop system.   The pilot’s control 
inputs are determined by the quality and quantity of cues received via all five 
physical senses: tactile, visual, aural, vestibular and smell.   The pilot selects 
the appropriate cue, applies perception, decides on the action and then 
makes a responding control input.   The control system and aircraft dynamics 
determine the response of the aircraft and the associated cues change within 
both the external and internal cockpit environment.   External disturbances 
such as wind gusts or turbulence also affect the aircraft and again dynamics 
respond accordingly (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2, Pilot in the Loop Compensatory Tracking Model 
 
So why does LoC happen?.   For the purposes of this paper, all LoC related 
accidents involve a stall and usually occur when the aircraft is low (below 
circuit or pattern height), slow and with partial or full flap deployed.   Using 
human factors analysis methods such as Wiegmann & Shappell [2], there are 
both active and latent errors present.   Latent errors being errors laying 
dormant for some time and active errors being conscious decisions and/or 
actions on behalf of the pilot that have contributed to the accident.   A simple 
pilot distraction or deliberate aerobatic manoeuvre can take the aircraft to the 
limits of its normal operating envelope and beyond. 
 
To assist in understanding the factors affecting LoC, a case study was 
selected:   Initial statistical analysis of fatal stall/spin accident rate by aircraft 
type conducted by GASCo, highlighted the case of the Cessna 150 and 152.   
These two aircraft, whilst apparently similar in design, have very different fatal 
stall/spin accident rates.   The Cessna 150 lies approximately on the average 
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of 0.65 fatals per 100,000 flying hours whereas the Cessna 152 has a rate of 
only 0.05 fatals per 100,000 flying hours.   These statistics were 
independently verified by the authors after obtaining source data directly from 
the CAA. 
 
 
DESIGN REVIEW 
 
A detailed design analysis was conducted and key differences affecting 
performance and handling qualities were thoroughly researched using 
available published material and informal interviews with type-experienced 
students, pilots and flying instructors (Table 1). 
 
Within the UK the Cessna 150 Models K, L & M account for approximately 
70% of all flying hours in the generic Cessna 150 family.   This study therefore 
concentrated upon these aircraft variants.   Comparing the Cessna 150 (K, L 
& M’s) to Cessna 152s, most Cessna 150s have airspeed indicators 
measured in mph (1975 and earlier models) not knots; the Cessna 150 has 10 
degrees more flap and a more complex flap activation and indication system 
(except 1977 ‘M’ model); the Cessna 150 has typically 50 lb less useful load, 
and cannot operate with 2 (adult) POB and full fuel without exceeding the 
MTOW.   In addition, an aft CG loading inside the CG envelope for Cessna 
152 could well be outside the envelope for a Cessna 150 under similar loading 
conditions.   Prop wash effects due to different engine/propeller combinations 
in the Cessna 150 could result in more aggressive power on stall 
characteristics, combined with less down elevator authority for stall recovery, 
although our understanding of this is currently weak 
 
The most noticeable difference is that of the CG location for similar loading 
conditions.   Theory suggests that a more aft CG results in lower static 
stability, the natural nose down tendency of an aircraft. 
 
Cessna 150L (‘74)
Cessna 150 M (‘75)
Cessna 152 (‘80)
Powerplant 100 hp @ 2750 rpm 
Continental
110 hp @ 2550 rpm 
Lycoming
Propeller McCauley Std McAuley ‘Gull Wing’
type propeller
MTOW (lbs) 1600 1670
CG Range (in) 31.5~37.5
( 19.9~30.1 %MAC)
31~36.5
(19.1~28.4 %MAC)
Flap Range (deg) 0~40, no detents 0~30, detents @ 
0/10/20/30
Flap Activation/Monitoring 2-way switch,
LH Door post Indicator
Gated 4 position 
switch, adj. indicator
VS0 (KCAS) Pwr Off/Aft 
CG/MTOW: L(30) 42 41
Table 1, Comparison of Design & Performance, Cessna 150L,150M & 152 
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THE FLIGHT TEST PROGRAMME 
 
A flight test programme was devised utilising examples of the Cessna 150 L, 
M and Cessna 152 aircraft types to gather additional research data in order to 
assess and compare the apparent performance and handling qualities (both 
qualitatively and quantitatively.   Prior to commencement of flight testing, an 
FDR calibration test flight was conducted with the support of the National 
Flying Laboratory at Cranfield University onboard their BAe Jetstream 31 
aeroplane.   This aircraft has onboard, calibrated systems for measuring all 
necessary in flight parameters and formed a useful baseline for comparison 
with the low-cost portable FDR unit (Appareo GAU 1000).   A series of 
dynamic stability tests were conducted to evaluate data outputs of the 
Appareo FDR. 
 
Following the calibration, flight tests were performed in the Cessna 150L, M 
and 152 for up to three different CG conditions relevant to the key design 
differences, focussing on apparent longitudinal (static and dynamic) stability 
and control characteristics, stalling and low-speed handling characteristics, as 
well as cockpit ergonomics / pilot workload (Table 2).   All tests used normal 
(unmodified) flying club aircraft in most cases with a 2-man (Test Pilot + Flight 
Test Engineer) crew.   Data was recorded manually on test cards and 
automatically using a low-cost, portable Flight Data Recorder (FDR).   In 
addition, a portable cockpit voice recorder and headset mounted video 
camera were used for debriefing.   Tests were commenced in the Cessna 152 
with mid-CG position and phased towards the aft position to minimise risk. 
 
   Phase 1    
Baseline CG1 CG2 CG3 
  Mid Mid-Aft Aft 
C152 - G-BOFL Sortie #1 Sortie #4 Sortie #6 
% MAC: 23.6% 25.1% XX% 
Flt Test/Sortie: 2006-06-04 2006-06-05 2006-06-06 
  & 2006-08-01   TBD 
F150L - G-BGLR 2     
% MAC: 25.2% N/A N/A 
Flt Test/Sortie: 2006-06-02     
        
F150M - G-BCRT Sortie #3 Sortie #5 Sortie #7 
% MAC: 25.5% 27.1% 27.8% 
Flt Test/Sortie: 2006-06-03 2006-06-08 2006-06-07 
        
Crew: 2 2 1 
 
Table 2, Flight Test Programme, Cessna 150 & 152 at different CG 
Conditions 
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A case could be made that for an exercise of this nature, involving simple 
certified aeroplanes, test planning could be substantially simplified compared 
to that of evaluation tasks in true research or developmental aeroplanes.  To 
some extent this is recognised within BFSL, but it is also recognised that as 
well as the development of new knowledge, BFSL’s role includes the training 
of flight test professionals and development of best practice in test conduct.  
Procedures thus have been developed which are similar to those in use in 
most other flight test organisations.  In particular, minimum planning 
requirements are separately laid down for use of certified aircraft (such as this 
case), experimental aircraft, or flight simulator work – these are shown in 
Table 3 below 
 
 TYPE OF TESTING 
 Certified 
aircraft 
(current permit 
or CofA) 
Experimental or 
developmental 
aircraft 
Flight simulator 
Test plan Y Y O 
Test cards Y Y Y 
Weight and balance 
statement 
Y Y Y 
Safety assessment 
and mitigation plan 
Y Y O 
Details to be lodged 
outside of aircraft 
Y Y N 
Crew competence 
statement 
Y Y O 
(Mandatory pilot 
competence 
statement for 
handling qualities 
assessments) 
Design statement 
and approval, 
including flight test 
instrumentation 
requirements 
O Y Y 
Maintenance 
approval 
N Y N 
Inspection approval N Y N 
Pilot acceptance of 
aircraft 
Y Y O 
Observers 
acceptance of 
briefing (if carried 
on-board aircraft) 
Y Y O 
Post flight report Y Y Y 
 
Y = Yes, required 
N = No, not required 
O = Optional, not mandatory but may be required for either best practice or educational 
purposes 
Table 3, Brunel Flight Safety Laboratory minimum flight test planning 
requirements 
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Additionally, BFSL procedures allow for an escalating number and specific 
requirements for authorising signature for test plans.  In this case: a certified 
aeroplane being paid for by an internal budget, and assessed as medium risk, 
but with cross-department interest (engineering and human factors) a 
minimum number of 3 signatories was required, although specifically 
encompassing the plan author, test pilot, budget holder, review signatory and 
head of laboratory.  (A worst case of a high risk trial in an experimental 
aeroplane would require a minimum of 5 separate signatures encompassing 8 
functions.) 
 
 
RESULTS & ANALYSIS 
 
For the specific aircraft tested, the results of the flight test programme, which 
are illustrated below in Figure 3 and Figure 4, showed that the Cessna 150 L 
& M have consistently lower apparent longitudinal static stability (LSS) than 
the Cessna 152 as measured by variation of stick forces versus airspeed in 
climb, cruise and approach configurations.   Qualitative assessments by the 
same test pilot for all three aircraft were consistent with quantitative results.   
Whilst numerical minimum standards are not applied to part 23 aeroplanes, 
normal guidance[3] plus larger aeroplane regulations[4, 5] are available as 
guidance and recommend a minimum stick force gradient of 1 lb/6kn.CAS; 
this recommendation is not met by any of the aeroplanes.  Additionally, the 
F150M in particular failed in the judgement of the test team to consistently 
meet the part 23 [6, 7] requirement that “The stick force must vary with speed 
so that any substantial speedchange results in a stick force clearly perceptible 
to the pilot.” (FAR-23.175(c)).  The deficiencies are most pronounced in the 
L30 and L40 configurations (L30, which exists for both the C150 and C152 
aeroplanes is illustrated in Figure 4.) 
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Figure 3, Comparison of Apparent LSS in the Cruise Configuration for  
the Cessna 150 L, 150M and Cessna 152 (mid-CG) 
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Figure 4, Comparison of Apparent LSS in the Landing Configuration (30  
Flap) for the Cessna 150 L, 150M and Cessna 152 (mid-CG) 
 
Using the portable flight data recorder, the pilots ability to track airspeed in the 
climb was also investigated.   This was done by developing a “pseudo CAS” 
term, described in Appendix A and using this on a time-trace Y-axis (Figure 5 
below)   It was found that the deviations from target airspeed were more 
noticeable for aircraft and configurations with lower stick force gradients.   As 
a result of poor stick force cues, the pilot was forced to make continuous 
corrections to airspeed, frequently referring to the airspeed and therefore 
increasing workload; in particular it was noticed that speed holding became 
poorer where aircraft management tasks were required: unsurprising in itself, 
but indicative of the marginal speed stability of the aeroplanes.  The authors 
found this data plot against pseudo-CAS particularly useful in comparison with 
pilot-generated HQR scores because with well defined desirable and 
adequate airspeed tolerance limits, it was then possible to identify whether the 
aircraft remained within those limits, and thus whether HQR scores should 
have been within the 1-3, 4-6, 7-9 or 10 bands. 
 
Figure 6 shows the corresponding Cooper-Harper HQRs recorded for the 
climb and point tracking task in the Cessna F150M with mid-aft CG.   The pilot 
rated the task as HQR 7, reflecting the high workload experienced in 
maintaining the desired airspeed tolerance of +/2 MIAS.   It can be seen that 
the airspeed tolerance deviates considerably at the commencement and 
completion of the task (in both cases > +5 MIAS) exceeding the adequate 
airspeed tolerance limits of +/- 5 MIAS.   This contributed to the overall pilot 
HQR rating of 7. 
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Figure 5, Time history for Climb & Point Tracking Task, Cessna F150M at 
Mid-aft CG. 
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Figure 6, Cooper-Harper Handling Quality Ratings, Climb & Point 
Tracking, Cessna F150M – Full Test 
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During power on stall testing, both the Cessna 150 L & M exhibited more 
aggressive stall characteristics than the Cessna 152.   In some cases, there 
was only limited advanced warning of the onset of stall and aircraft failed to 
meet CS23 [7] requirements in that, for example, a C150M in the landing 
configuration with greater than 65% power was capable of entering an 
incipient spin at the point of stall, as well as the previously mentioned failure to 
demonstrate a clearly discernible stick force gradient 
 
 
LESSONS LEARNED 
 
Lessons from the Flight Test Engineer 
- Utilising standard (unmodified) flying club aircraft for flight testing 
requires fully portable flight test techniques and equipment.    
- Simple issues such as the access to aircraft power for portable 
equipment vary from aircraft to aircraft.    
- Working within an academic budget usually means working within strict 
limited a limited budget where flying time is money – so proper 
planning and the identification of required programme changes as early 
as possible is required.   
- Quickly identifying the points of greatest interest for each aircraft tested 
can save valuable time & money further down the line in the 
programme.    
- The importance of coinciding qualitative pilot assessment of aircraft 
handling qualities (HQRs), which can often appear subjective and 
erratic to an Engineer, as well as the better understood use of 
quantitative analysis has been proven.   The pilot qualitative analysis 
adds a workload dimension to the task being performed not easily 
measured by an instrument.   
- The use of a ‘calibrated’ TP is therefore essential for consistency in 
comparison of results.   The data reduction process can be 
considerably shortened by using Test Cards designed with data 
reduction in mind – a ‘key it once’ philosophy pays dividends and can 
reduce data reduction time between sorties (all reports completed 
within 24 hrs).    
- Expect technical problems with the technology and build in redundancy 
where possible.   The CVR was invaluable in this respect, but there is 
never in this sort of testing a good reason not to take reasonably 
detailed notes in flight.    
- For technical reporting, the conflict between academic rigour and 
brevity was also apparent; it is tempting to thoroughly analyse and 
report every test point in every flight – in reality this is completely 
impractical at any sensible sortie rate, and in addition attempting to do 
so means that reports seldom are written rapidly enough for any 
corrections to be made from crew memory: the old requirement for a 24 
hour PFR is one which the authors found important to try and adhere 
to, with that timescale dictating reporting depth.  Further analysis can 
be completed from data later as required, so long as it has been 
adequately recorded and indexed. 
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Lessons from the Test Pilot 
- The largest lesson of this programme, learned during an unexpected 
and undesired incipient spin, was that even relatively docile (and 
certified!) GA aircraft can present the pilot handling with extreme 
attitudes and a need for emergency handling actions.   To this end 
briefing for possible emergencies was always necessary before leaving 
the ground, and regularly in flight – for example briefing spin recoveries 
before a stall test.    
- When using aircraft within a flying club environment, expect them to be 
sub-optimal; flying training is a low-margin industry and aeroplanes 
routinely carry multiple faults.    
o A thorough review of all documentation and pre-pre-flight is 
paramount.    
o In the aircraft tested, 1 in 3 W&CG schedules contained errors and 
serious consideration was given to re-weighing the aircraft as a 
result.    
o Hiring flying club aircraft means fitting within a schedule designed to 
maximise use of the aircraft.  A test team who wish to postpone 
testing because of conditions which are suitable for normal club 
flying but unsuitable for the test in hand are costing the operator 
money and losing goodwill.  This requires continuous 
communication and introduction of a certain level of programme 
flexibility which might not be what the test team really would prefer 
o No-go criteria must be established, agreed, and stuck to.  Whilst 
this is of-course true for all flying, they are often more restrictive for 
test flying, and the aircraft operator must be given opportunities to 
understand, and hopefully accept, the test teams criteria.    
 
 
Team lessons 
- CRM is as important in this test environment as in any other.  In 
particular, the team whilst formally divided into TP/FTE should 
understand and use each other’s skills.  In the authors’ case this was 
well illustrated when the pilot’s seat became unlocked during a 
performance climb – a known Cessna fault, but potentially serious if the 
level of collaboration between the crew had not ensured this was 
reduced to a non-event. 
- Co-ordination of HQR[8] and quantitative assessment works extremely 
well, and in particular the use of FDR data to demark tasks into broad 
HQR brackets based upon demonstrated adherence within desirable 
and essential limits. 
- Definition of the Cooper-Harper task is never trivial[9], and should be 
regarded as one of the major components of test planning.  Criteria 
used for task construction can, and did, include PPL and CPL test 
requirements, margin above the stall, margin below the speed which 
gives a zero rate of climb, the speed range which gave close to 
scheduled climb performance, being able to compare similar results 
between different aeroplane types, and developing experience of 
operating the aeroplanes.  Task definition, effectiveness in addressing 
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the research question, and potential for improvement, along with 
requirements for maintained standardisation with other results, should 
be a routine part of sortie debriefs. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
For the specific aircraft tested and associated test configurations, the centre of 
gravity appears to minimally impact, and flap setting and power strongly 
impact the apparent longitudinal static stability.   From the pilot’s perspective, 
corresponding stick forces decrease, as would be expected, with aft 
movement of the CG and the associated stick force cues become weaker.   
This degrades the pilot’s ability to track and maintain airspeed during critical 
phases of flight such as the climb, landing and go-around.   For more 
experienced pilots, they have to work harder to track and maintain airspeed.   
An event trigger, leading to a significant deviation from the target airspeed, 
could result in a significant reduction in safety margin, with potential for LoC. 
 
 
FURTHER WORK 
 
This research is very much an ongoing programme, and the team’s short to 
medium term objectives fall into four parts: 
 
- Additional flight testing (phase 2) with other examples of the Cessna 
150 L, M and Cessna 152 is necessary to establish whether the results 
so far demonstrate fleet-wide characteristics or are specific to each 
aircraft tested.   The test will focus on critical test cases only. 
- The research programme will also be extended to other aircraft types 
with marked differences in fatal accident rates for further insight into the 
LoC problem.  In particular, the team hope to investigate the two 
groupings of straight wing Piper Cherokees (such as the PA28-140 and 
PA28-160) versus the newer tapered wing variants (such as the PA28-
161 and PA28-180RT) which statistically exhibit similar patterns to the 
C150 versus C152 groupings (if anything more pronounced, with no 
tapered wing LoC related fatal accidents in 27 years of available UK 
records.) 
- A series of simulation tests in the controlled environment of the 
university’s Merlin MP521 flight simulator (Figure 7) is also planned.   
The tests will re-create potential LoC scenarios under different 
apparent longitudinal static stability conditions, using a group of 
approximately 50 volunteer pilots representative of the current UK GA 
community.   Pilot workload will be investigated (particularly using 
measurement of heart rate and eye motion) in addition to the 
evaluation of handling quality rating group-crossovers as previously 
described for flight testing. 
- Desktop modelling of the ‘pilot in the loop’ with Matlab / Simulink is also 
planned with varying stock force gradients and other aircraft control 
system characteristics to gather additional data for comparison.  Initially 
it is hoped to generate a model which is representative of working PiL 
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models whilst giving similar results to those generated experimentally, 
particularly for the data-rich C150/C152 study.  Subsequently, it is 
hoped that this model can be modified within limited parameters (for 
example stick force gradients or pilot reaction times) to allow tentative 
conclusions about the safety implications of a wider range of aircraft 
characteristics than those already tested. 
 
 
Figure 7, Brunel University's Merlin MP521 Reconfigurable Flight 
Simulator 
 
More tentative, longer term plans involve converging this research into LoC 
and in particular LoC avoidance with another BFSL programme investigating 
performance of light aeroplanes at low level (in response to a requirement 
from the air racing community) to investigate best actions following, and safety 
planning for, engine failures or glider cable-breaks at low level. 
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APPENDIX A – Pseudo CAS 
 
During the flight test programme, quantitative data obtained from the portable 
flight data recorded was used to determine the airspeed point tracking 
qualities of the aircraft during the climb.   The flight data recorder used for 
flight test, records all airspeeds as groundspeed in knots, including wind 
effects.   It was necessary to convert this into a ‘pseudos CAS’ airspeed to 
correct for density altitude in the climb and wind effects.   Ignoring 
compressibility effects and assuming wind is zero, then using McCormick [10] 
& Gratton [11]:-  
 
 
EASCAS VV =  
 
Where:- 
 
σTASEAS VV =  
 
And 
 
)( WINDACWINDGNDTAS COSVVV φφ −+=  
 
 
Then substituting gives:- 
 
σGNDCAS VV =  (Equation 1) 
 
 
From McCormick again:- 
2561.4θσ =  
 
 
h02256.01−=θ  
 
Where h is altitude in kilometres. 
 
 
 
 
 
 17 
 
BIOGRAPHIES 
 
 
Mike Bromfield (presenting author) 
Research Assistant, Brunel Flight Safety Laboratory (Brunel University) 
 
Education: 
 
- Bachelors degree in Aeronautical Engineering, University of Bath, UK 
1984 
- Master of Philosophy in Engineering Design & Simulation, University of 
Glamorgan, UK 1988 
- Diploma in Management Studies, University of Glamorgan, UK 1988 
- Currently in full-time study for a PhD in Aviation Safety, Brunel 
University, UK 
 
Highlights of Flight Testing Experience:- 
 
- In 1979 commenced a sponsored Engineering Technologist 
Apprenticeship with Westland Helicopters, Yeovil, UK.   During that 
time was seconded to the Flight Test department to gain experience in 
flight test.   Flew in rotary wing aircraft including Navy Lynx, Sea King, 
Commando, and WG30 as FTE recording flight test data.   Seconded 
to the Aerodynamics department to conduct data reduction & data 
analysis of flight test data to ‘close the loop’.   After completing my 
apprenticeship and graduating,   left Westland Helicopters to pursue 
interests in Information Technology & Management Consultancy. 
- In 1997 gained my PPL whilst living and working in Australia, and re-
kindled my interest in all things aeronautical.   Since built up pilot in 
command time in 12 different GA aircraft types as well as developing 
interests in flight safety. 
- In 2007 joined Brunel University as a Research Assistant to study (full-
time) for a PhD in Aviation Safety.   Conducting research with Brunel 
Flight Safety Laboratory into ‘factors affecting loss of control of general 
aviation aircraft’, the single largest category of fatal GA accidents in the 
UK.   Also teaching Aviation Safety to final year undergraduates on 
Brunel’s Aviation Engineering with Pilot Studies course. 
- In 2008, attended the National Test Pilot School’s short course 
‘Performance and Flying Qualities of Fixed-Wing Aircraft’ to update 
skills  and knowledge after considerable ‘time out’. 
- Currently acting as FTE on the BFSL GA research flight test 
programme and am responsible for the development of test plans, data 
reduction and data analysis.   In addition to this, also responsible for 
the technical support of ‘off-the-shelf’, portable FDR equipment. 
 
 18 
 
Dr Guy Gratton 
Head of Brunel Flight Safety Laboratory (Brunel University) & 
Head of Facility for Airborne Atmospheric Measurements (Cranfield 
University) 
 
 
Education: 
 
- Bachelors degree in Aeronautics and Astronautics, University of 
Southampton, 1992. 
- PhD in Airworthiness evaluation techniques, University of 
Southampton, 2005 
 
 
Highlights of Flight Testing Experience:- 
 
- Flight test Engineer at Boscombe Down shortly after graduating from 
University, flew mostly in training and ground attack aeroplanes, 
including being “chief turn counter” for Tucano spinning trials, where we 
discovered the joys of going from -2½g in an inverted spin to a 4g pull 
out in 2 seconds, then regaining consciousness a few seconds later, as 
well as 19 turn erect spins which were supposed to be 6. 
- Progressed to being head of Environmental Test from 1996-1997, 
managing facilities for environmental testing of the EH101 Merlin, Lynx 
AH8 and Saab JAS-39 Gripen.. 
- Chief Technical Officer at the British Microlight Aircraft Association from 
1997-2005, also head of Flight Test and becoming approved by the 
CAA as a Test Pilot on Microlight Aeroplanes from 1999.  Flew within 
numerous programmes with take-off weights from 350 to 1,000 lb, 
covering several control systems and 6 first flights of new-build 
aeroplanes, 3 of them new variants.  During this period also did a part 
time PhD that concentrated upon departures from controlled flight and 
development of light aircraft flight test techniques. 
- In 2005 joined Brunel University to teach various aircraft design and 
operational subjects, and also founded Brunel Flight Safety Laboratory 
– concentrating upon GA safety research. 
- In 2008 became head of UK government funded Facility for Airborne 
Atmospheric Measurements, operating the BAe-146-301 large 
Atmospheric Research Aircraft (ARA) based at Cranfield. 
- Currently head of both BFSL and FAAM, flying (not often enough) as 
back-end crew on the ARA, as a TP for light aviation research projects 
and for occasional BMAA testing.  Currently have logged 100 types as 
operating crew, 50 of those as Pilot in Command, and about 2/3 of 
those types in some form of flight test. 
 19 
 
REFERENCES 
                                                 
1  Thorpe J., GASCo Flight Safety Seminar, RAF Uxbridge, 30th June  , 2008. 
 
2  Wiegmann, D.A., & Shappell, S.A., A Human Error Approach to Aviation 
Accident Analysis, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2003. 
 
3 Roskam, J., Airplane Flight Dynamics and Automated Flight Controls, Design 
Analysis & Research Corporation, 2007. 
 
4 FAA, FAA Part 25, Civil Airworthiness Standards for Airplane> 12,000 lbs, 
USA, February 2009. 
 
5  EASA,  CS25 Certification Specifications for Large Aeroplanes, February 
2009. 
 
6  FAA, FAA Part 23, Civil Airworthiness Standards for Airplanes < 12,000 lbs, 
USA, February 2009. 
 
7  EASA, CS23 Certification Specifications for Normal, Utility, Aerobatic, and 
Commuter Category Aeroplanes, February 2009. 
 
8  Cooper, G.E. & Harper R.P., The Use of Pilot Rating in the Evaluation of 
Aircraft Handling Qualities. AGARD-R-567, 1969 & NASA, Report TN-D-
5153, 1969. 
 
9  Wagner, G. & Wilkerson, B., Proceedings of the 47th Annual SETP 
Symposium CC-130J Handling Qualities Evaluation and the Cooper-Harper 
Task Definition, SETP 2003. 
 
10  McCormick, B.W., Aerodynamics, Aeronautics and Fight Mechanics, John 
Wiley & Sons, 1979. 
 
11  G B Gratton, Use of Global Positioning System velocity outputs for 
determining airspeed measurement error, Aeronautical Journal Vol. 111 
No.1120 pp381-388 (June 2007). 
 
